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Abstract
The debate on the fragmentation of International Law has been relatively 
dormant in recent years. However, recent events demonstrate not only that this 
debate should be re-awoken, but also that some key elements of this debate must 
be reconsidered. Notably, while the fragmentation of International Law has often 
been discussed from the perspective of courts and judges, this article examines 
the view and the impact of a different institutional actor – the Commission of 
the European Union. This contribution analyzes a series of amicus briefs that 
were submitted in a number of investment treaties-based cases. These briefs, 
which were recently disclosed to the author, reflect a certain radicalization of 
the European Court of Justice’s view concerning the place and the role of the 
EU’s legal system within the international legal order. This article discusses 
the problematic implications that the Commission’s approach may have on the 
international legal order, as well as possible future pathways.   
A. It’s the Fragmentation… All Over Again…
The phenomenon referred to as the fragmentation of International Law 
describes the structure of International Law. It portrays a universe of isolated, 
self-contained legal regimes (e.g. trade law, human rights law, environmental 
law, etc.) that have developed over the years with minimal, or no coordination. 
This isolation and lack of coordination are, at least potentially, problematic, as 
they imply the possibility of certain conflicts, inter alia between the instructions 
established by these regimes. The International Law Commission (ILC) 
described this possibility as a case in which “[two or more] relevant treaties seem 
to point to different directions in their application by a party”. 1    
The debate about the fragmentation of International Law has dominated 
much of the academic sphere during the last decade. Numerous academic 
articles, symposiums and PhD dissertations were dedicated to the questions 
that underline this debate, notably the following three: (1) Does fragmentation 
really exist?; (2) Should fragmentation be considered a problem?; and (3) In case 
the first two questions are to be answered affirmatively, what should be done 
1  Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission to the Fifty-Eighth Session, 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, 81, para. 22 
[ILC Report]. 
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about it? These questions have been discussed and debated extensively (and some 
would say exhaustedly) by academics, who have provided a variety of opinions.2 
As described by T. Broude, in recent years the debate over the fragmentation 
of International Law “has virtually gone silent”.3 Broude explains the demise of 
the debate in the following words: 
“[F]ragmentation as a phenomenon – its causes, its effects, its 
significance – is now hardly the subject of heated arguments and 
lofty theoretical debates, and perhaps most importantly, is no 
longer considered to constitute an existential threat to international 
law as a system. Fragmentation has to great extent been normalized, 
accepted, as it were, as both politically inevitable and legally 
manageable.”4
In other words, the debate has died out because the fear of fragmentation 
had been over-exaggerated, and by and large can be lived with. This conclusion 
of the debate signifies a victory for the position championed at the time by 
former International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judge Bruno Simma. Simma, as 
early as 2003, declined to view fragmentation as a threat to the unification of 
International Law. Rather, he preferred to view it in a more positive light, as an 
expression of the diversification and the expansion of International Law.5 
Simma also added that indeed, despite the proliferation of international 
courts, fragmentation did not result in contradictory jurisprudence.6 This state of 
affairs is attributed according to Simma, as well as other notable commentators 
such as former Judge Gilbert Guillaume,7 to some sort of a highly delicate, 
unofficial and somewhat psychological mechanism: International adjudicators, 
2  See e.g., ILC Report, supra note 1; R. Michaels & J. Pauwelyn, ‘Conflict of Norms or 
Conflict of Laws? Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of International Law’, 22 
Duke Law Working Papers (2012) 3, 349; T. Broude & Y. Shany, Multi-Source Equivalent 
Norms in International Law (2010).
3  T. Broude, ‘Keep Calm and Carry on: Martti Koskenniemi and the Fragmentation of 
International Law’, 27 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal (2013) 2, 279, 
279.
4  Ibid., 280. 
5  B. Simma, ‘Fragmentation in a Positive Light’, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 
(2004) 1, 845, 847 [Simma, Fragmentation in a Positive Light]. 
6  B. Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the perspective of a practitioner’, 20 
The European Journal of International Law (2009) 2, 265, 278 [Simma, Universality].
7  Speech by ICJ President G. Guillaume to the Sixth Committee of the UN General 
Assembly, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the 
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it is argued, are mindful of the threats of fragmentation; they are “anxious to 
avoid” conflicts,8 and display the “utmost caution in avoiding to contradict each 
other.”9 The unity of International Law, according to former ICJ Judges Simma 
and Guillaume, remains firm due to individual Judges’ understanding of the 
situation, and their willingness to stand up for this unity, even “at the price of 
dodging issues that would very much have deserved to be tackled.”10 
Although the mechanism described by Simma and Guillaume seems 
extremely fragile, one must admit that it has held, at least well enough so as to 
put the fragmentation debate to sleep. The lack of smoking gun evidence of the 
threats often attributed to fragmentation seems to show that indeed, as Broude 
puts it, fragmentation is “manageable”.11
This article is intended to re-open the currently dormant discussion about 
the fragmentation of International Law. The author believes that there are two 
reasons for doing this. First, the events described below demonstrate that the 
delicate mechanism illustrated by Simma can be easily crashed, and that, unlike 
Simma’s evaluation, some international institutions are not keen at all to uphold 
the unity of International Law. It could be therefore that other methods and 
techniques besides the legal tools often discussed in this context12 should be 
considered. 
Secondly, these events also reveal that besides courts, other institutions’ role 
and impact on fragmentation could well be meaningful in this context. The role 
of institutions in this field is especially interesting in light of the ILC’s decision 
to ignore this issue in its iconic report on the fragmentation of International 
Law. The ILC took the position that “[t]he issue of institutional competencies is 
best dealt with by the institutions themselves.”13 Also Simma, while addressing 
institutional aspects related to courts, did not dedicate much attention to other 
institutional actors such as international organizations, apart from stating that 
“when they interpret and apply international law, [they] need to bear in mind 
that they are acting within an overarching framework of international law, 
International Legal Order’ (2000), available at http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.
php?pr=85&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1 (last visited 26 June 2016).
8  Guillaume, supra note 7.
9  Simma, ‘Fragmentation in a Positive Light’, supra note 5, 847.
10  Ibid., 846. 
11  Broude, supra note 3, 280.
12  Notably the VCLT’s “tool-box” rules, as described in ILC Report, supra note 1, 249, para. 
492. 
13  Ibid., 13, para. 13. 
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residual as it may be.”14 The events described below, however, demonstrate that 
certain institutional actors may be very important in this respect. The role of 
such institutions, their views on the structure of International Law and their 
impact on fragmentation should therefore be examined. 
B. The European Union’s Institutions and Fragmentation
Many of the events that are generating a renewed interest in the 
fragmentation debate are related to the European Union (EU), its law and 
its institutions’ approach towards International Law. The EU is a relatively 
unique creature in International Law, being a branch of International Law, an 
international organization, and also a party to numerous treaties.15 While a 
discussion of the legal conflicts between EU Law and other types of International 
Law is interesting and deserves academic attention,16 this contribution will focus 
on the EU institutions’ approach towards the fragmentation issue, their view 
concerning the place of EU Law within the international legal order, and their 
role in both enhancing and overcoming fragmentation.
While the focus of this article will be placed on the EU Commission’s 
view and actions, it is important first of all to present the approach taken by 
the EU’s judicial arm – the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – with respect 
to the fragmentation of International Law. The ECJ’s attitude towards other 
competing sources of authority seems to guide the Commission in its activity, 
notably in its attempts to impose complete EU legal hegemony, even outside of 
the EU’s legal sphere.    
14  Simma, ‘Universality’, supra note 6, 271. 
15  On the relationship between international law and EU law, see K. Ziegler, ‘The 
Relationship Between EU Law and International Law’, in D. Patterson & A. Soderston 
(eds), A Companion to EU and International Law (2016), 42, [Ziegler, Relationship]; ILC 
Report, supra note 1, 113, para. 219.
16  Much has been written about the legal conflicts between EU law and other types of 
international law, see e.g., V. Kosta et al. (eds), ‘The EU Accession to the ECHR’ (2014); 
A. Dimopoulos, ‘The validity and applicability of International Investment Agreements 
Between EU Member States Under EU and International Law’ 48 Common Market Law 
Review (2011) 1, 63.
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I. The European Court of Justice and the Fragmentation of 
 International Law
In the eyes of the ECJ, the EU treaties more closely resemble constitutional 
documents17 than international treaties. This approach finds its origins in the 
iconic Van Gend en Loos judgement, in which the ECJ described the Treaty 
Establishing the European Economic Community18 as “more than an agreement 
which merely creates mutual obligations between the Contracting States”.19 The 
ECJ’s constitutional approach, as well as its relevance to the fragmentation of 
International Law, was demonstrated most notably in its Kadi decision.20 In the 
Kadi case, the ECJ faced a classic fragmentation situation in which certain EU 
Law obligations conflicted with those of the Charter of the United Nations (UN 
Charter). The ECJ solved this conflict by de facto prioritizing EU Law over the 
UN Charter. Ziegler commented that the Kadi decision goes as far as “sever[ing] 
the Community from its origins in international law.”21 De Búrca added in this 
respect: 
“In particular, the judgement represents a significant departure 
from the conventional presentation and widespread understanding 
of the EU as an actor maintaining a distinctive commitment to 
international law and institutions.”22
17  See in ILC Report, supra note 1, 113, para. 218; see also, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. 
European Parliament, Case No. 294/83, Judgment of 23 April 1986, [1986] ECR 01339, 
1365.
18  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 11.
19  Van Gend en Loos, Case No. 26/62, Judgment of 5 February 1963, [1963] ECR 1, 12.
20  G. de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After 
Kadi’, 51 Harvard International Law Journal (2010) 1,1; Ziegler, ‘Relationship’, supra note 
15, 9; K. Ziegler, ‘Strengthening the Rule of Law but Fragmenting International Law: 
The Kadi Decision of the ECJ from the perspective of human rights’ 9 Human Rights Law 
Review (2009) 2, 288 [Ziegler, Strengthening the rule of law]; Yassin Abdullah Kadi and 
Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the European Union and Commission 
of the European Communities, Joined Cases Nos 402 & 415/05, Judgment of 3 September 
2008, [2008] ECR I-6351 [Kadi].
21  Ziegler, ‘Strengthening the rule of law’, ibid., 303.
22  de Búrca, supra note 20, 2. 
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And that:
“[T]he ECJ has chosen to use the much-anticipated Kadi ruling as 
the occasion to proclaim the primacy of its internal constitutional 
values over the norms of international law.”23  
The approach displayed in the Kadi decision was recently reinforced by the 
ECJ in its opinion concerning the EU’s accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights24 (ECHR). In December 2014, the ECJ decided to reject the EU’s 
Accession Treaty to the ECHR based on potential incompatibilities between 
the ECHR and EU Law.25 The ECJ mentions, inter alia, that the autonomy 
of EU Law “in relation to international law requires that the interpretation of 
those fundamental rights be ensured within the framework of the structure and 
objectives of the EU”.26 The ECJ added that “in particular”, the possibility that 
the ECJ’s findings will be questioned by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) is unacceptable.27 
Following this decision the ECJ was described by authors as creating a 
“fortress EU”,28 and as:
“[S]tan[ding] guard at the gates of the EU legal order, Cerberus-
like, one head fending off national constitutional courts, the other 
keeping the WTO and UN at bay, and now, a third glowering at 
the European Court of Human Rights.”29 
The strong constitutionalist approach demonstrated by the ECJ casts 
doubts on Simma and Guillaume’s belief in the role of international adjudicators 
as the guardians of the unified legal order. It also demonstrates how fragile 
23  de Búrca, supra note 20, 49.
24  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 3 
September 1953, 213 UNTS 221.
25  Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – Compatibility of the Draft Agreement With the EU and 
FEU Treaties, Opinion 2/13, 18 December 2014, C-2/13, [ECJ Opinion 2/13].
26  Ibid., para. 170.
27  Ibid., para. 186. 
28  A. Lazowsky & R. Wessel, ‘When Caveats Turn Into Locks: Opinion 2/13 on Accession 
of the European Union to the ECHR’ 16 German Law Journal (2015) 1, 179, 187.
29  T. Isiksel, ‘European Exceptionalism and the EU’s accession to the ECHR’ (2015) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2590178 (last visited 27 
June 2016).
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in reality this mechanism is, when it seems that some courts simply do not 
regard the unity of International Law as important. This is especially true if 
it is remembered that the judges themselves may be a part of the problem, 
particularly in the more specialized systems of International Law, where 
professional communities can be regarded as somewhat segregated from the 
general International Law community.30
While it is often the ECJ that is mentioned in the discussion on the 
relationship between EU Law and International Law, other EU institutions should 
not be ignored. In a recent set of events, the EU Commission (Commission) 
demonstrated its own role as a possible agent of fragmentation. Notably, the 
Commission attempted to impose the ECJ’s own constitutional, and somewhat 
isolationist approach towards the traditional rules of Public International Law, 
as well as towards other branches of International Law. 
While the ECJ applied this approach within its own home court, the 
Commission took one step further: It directly demanded that non-EU tribunals 
also accept this Euro-supremacist approach, and topped its demand with an 
implied threat concerning the consequences of ignoring it. Furthermore, while 
the ECJ bases its decisions on its own applicable law, the Commission insisted on 
basing the claims it presented in international, non-EU fora, almost exclusively 
on EU Law. This article argues that the Commission’s action, in these cases, 
not only widens the already existing fragmentation, but also batters the delicate, 
somewhat diplomatic mechanism described by Judges Simma and Guillaume 
that guards the unity of International Law. 
The story, however, does not end here. With no early indication or 
warning, in April 2015 the Commission submitted four additional briefs in 
which it (almost) completely abandoned its previous EU-supremacist approach, 
and possibly even departed from the ECJ’s own traditional line. These briefs were 
based almost exclusively on International Law, considering the EU legal order as 
an equal among other regimes, rather than as a supreme source of authority. The 
30  Many have written about the fundamental differences existing between the communities 
surrounding each field of international law, whether differences in culture, ethos or expert 
knowledge, see e.g., O. Perez, ‘Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkages, and International 
Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the WTO’, 26 University of Pennsylvania Journal 
of International Economic Law (2005) 4, 735; J. Ellis, ‘Sustainable Development and 
Fragmentation in International Society’, in D. French (ed.), Global Justice and Sustainable 
Development (2010), 57; see also Haas’ research on epistemic communities P. M. Haas, 
‘Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordination’, 46 
International Organization (1992) 1, 1.
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Commission’s approach(es), as reflected in its amicus submissions, are presented 
below.       
II. The EU Commission’s Approach(es) to International Law
The following section reviews the EU Commission’s amicus submissions 
in a number of investment treaties-based cases. This review is based on the 
limited access that the author was granted by the Commission to the latter’s 
amicus briefs that were submitted in a line of investment disputes, as well as on 
a review of these briefs by investment tribunals. 
The following section begins with the review and analysis of the EURAM 
and U.S. Steel cases, which are the only pre-2015 cases in which the Commission’s 
own briefs were available to the author. The author will then review the Micula 
case, partly because of the arguments made by the Commission in this case, 
but also due to the events that took place after the arbitration award was issued. 
The Eureko and Electrabel cases also warrant an examination here because of 
the informative discussions presented by the tribunals in these cases, and the 
somewhat unique position expressed by the Commission in the Electrabel case. 
Finally, the author will review the Commission’s most recent submissions, filed 
in the four Czech cases.31 These submissions, which were recently released to the 
author by the Commission, are important as they represent an apparent 180° 
turn in the Commission’s approach concerning the role of the EU legal order, 
within International Law. 
Beyond these cases the Commission has intervened, or asked to intervene, 
as amicus in other cases as well.32 Due to scope and space limitations, and because 
of the fact that the Commission’s arguments by and large presented in the cases 
have been discussed in this article, the author will not elaborate on these cases. 
31  Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-20, registered 8 May 2013, 
pending [Voltaic]; I.C.W. Europe Investments Limited v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 
2014-22, registered 8 May 2013, pending [I.C.W.]; Photovoltaic Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. 
Czech Republic, PCA, registered 8 May 2013, pending [Photovoltaic]; WA Investments-
Europa Nova Limited v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-19, registered 8 May 2013, 
pending [WA Investments] [the Czech Cases].
32  See e.g., EDF International v. Hungary, UNCITRAL, PCA, Award of 4 December 2014 
available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/investigation-in-recent-briefs-european-
commission-casts-doubt-on-application-of-energy-charter-treaty-to-any-intra-eu-
dispute/ (last visited 1 August 2016); Eastern Sugar v. The Czech Republic, SCC Case No. 
088/2004, Partial Award of 27 March 2007. 
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1. The Commission’s Position in EURAM v. Slovakia
The European American Investment Bank (EURAM) v. Slovakia arbitration 
commenced in 2009, based on a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between 
Austria and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, which became binding on 
Slovakia by accession (Austria-Slovakia BIT).33 The claimant, a private health 
insurance provider, claimed that a new Slovakian law, which prohibited the 
distribution of dividends, and required the re-investment of all profits for the 
provision of public health care, resulted in the breach of several sections of the 
Austria-Slovakia BIT.34
Slovakia argued that because of its accession into the EU, and due to the 
fact that EU Law covers similar subject matter, the Austria-Slovakia BIT cannot 
be applied and the arbitral panel should decline jurisdiction.35 Slovakia relied in 
its arguments on, among other sources, Public International Law, notably the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT ).  
Noticing the potential clash between the different legal regimes, including 
the potential impact on the EU’s treaties’ objectives, the EURAM Tribunal 
decided to contact the Commission and invite it to submit its observations. In 
its brief letter of reply (dated October 2011), the Commission opened by stating 
that as the parties to this dispute are a EU Member State and an EU investor, 
both “are therefore required to respect the primacy of European Union law as 
well as the autonomy of its judicial system”36 (emphasis added). In other words, 
the Commission’s starting point is not one of a competition between different 
branches of International Law, but rather one that assumes immediate hegemony 
in any case of normative conflicts between the EU regime and any other. 
33  Agreement Between the Republic of Austria and the Czech and Slovak Republic Concerning 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 21 October 1992, available at http://
www.investorstatelawguide.com/documents/documents/BIT-0103%20-%20Austria-
Slovakia%20(Czechoslovakia)%20(1990)%20[english%20translation]%20UNTS.pdf 
(10 August 2016).
  Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 1 October 1992, available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/laws/italaw6195%284%29.pdf (last visited 10 
August 2016).
34  European American Investment Bank AG v. The Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, 
PCA Case No. 2010-17, 22 October 2012, para. 46 [EURAM, Award on Jurisdiction]. 
35  Ibid., para. 48. 
36  European Commission, ‘Letter Submitted by the European Commission to the Tribunal 
Concerning European American Investment Bank AG (Austria) v. Slovakia, PCA Case No- 
2010-17’, 13 October 2011, Ref. Ares(2011)1091296 [EU Commission’s Observations].
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The Commission continued by stressing that, as EU Laws “form part of 
the public order of all its Member States”, the activity of non-EU tribunals ruling 
on issues that are also regulated by EU Law (i.e. where competing jurisdiction 
exists) is “in breach of this public order”. Therefore where non-EU tribunals 
issue decisions that do not conform to EU Law, these arbitral awards will not 
be recognized or enforced within the EU.37 The Commission adds that the 
discussed subject matter is indeed covered by EU Law, and ends its submission 
with a demand that, based on the above, the investment tribunal should decline 
jurisdiction in this case.38 
Unlike Slovakia, the Commission did not refer in its submissions to any of 
the traditional techniques available under Public International Law concerning 
the relationship between international regimes, including those enshrined in the 
VCLT (e.g. Articles 30 and 31 of the VCLT ).
The EURAM Tribunal, in stark contradiction to the Commission’s 
approach, relies in its analysis primarily (and in great length and detail)39 on 
International Law. The Tribunal opens by discussing the relevance of the VCLT, 
and by specifically stating what some may consider as a given – that EU Law 
is indeed a part of International Law.40 As such, the Tribunal continues, the 
relationship between the BIT and EU Law should be evaluated by the tools 
provided by Public International Law, notably the VCLT.41 The Tribunal 
continues by evaluating the conflict between the two regimes by using Article 
59 VCLT (the lex posterior rule), which, according to the Tribunal need not 
be applied under the circumstances, as the two regimes in question, despite 
the Commission’s position, do not have the same subject matter, and therefore 
should not be regarded as conflicting.42 
Concerning the argument according to which the EU’s Human Rights 
Law includes obligations that are, in essence, overlapping with those available in 
the BIT, the Tribunal (relying inter alia on the ITLOS Bluefin Tuna decision)43 
states that “the two treaties are far from being so incompatible that they cannot 
be applied at the same time.”44 The Tribunal adds: 
37  ‘EU Commission’s Observations’, supra note 36, 2. 
38  Ibid., 3, 5.
39  The Tribunal dedicates more than 60 pages to its public international law-based analysis. 
40  EURAM, Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 34, paras 69-72.
41  Ibid., paras 73-76.
42  Ibid., para. 178. 
43  Ibid., para. 231.
44  Ibid., para. 226.
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“If indeed, the investors are protected in a similar way by two different 
regimes, why should only one of these regimes be applicable? In 
such a factual situation, the Tribunal considers that far from being 
necessarily incompatible, the parallel rules under the BIT and the 
ECT, can be cumulatively applied.”45
The Tribunal then continues to address other issues based on Public 
International Law rules, including the notification requirement imposed by 
Article 65 VCLT,46 as well as Article 30 VCLT,47 and reaches the conclusion that 
the two regimes in this case, could be interpreted in “harmony”,48 and that the 
one does not lead to the inapplicability of the other.49 
2. The Commission’s Position in U.S. Steel v. Slovakia 
The U.S. Steel Global Holdings v. The Slovak Republic arbitration started 
in 2013, based on a BIT between the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak 
Federal Republic, which became binding on Slovakia by accession (Netherlands-
Slovakia BIT ).50 In May 2014 the Commission submitted an amicus curiae 
brief.51 Although this case was eventually discontinued, this particular amicus 
curiae brief is one of the only two pre-2015 amicus briefs that are currently 
available to the author (in addition to the above discussed EURAM brief).52 
Unlike the 4 page EURAM brief discussed above, the Commission’s amicus 
submission in the U.S. Steel case is a long in-depth analysis, which provides for 
the first time an opportunity to properly assess the Commission’s legal position, 
as well as its attitude towards International Law as implied from the language, 
arguments, references and sources on which the Commission relied.      
45  EURAM, Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 34, para. 228.
46  Ibid., para. 235.
47  Ibid., para. 239.
48  Ibid., para. 236.
49  Ibid., para. 279.
50  U.S. Steel Global Holdings I B.V. v. The Slovak Republic, PCA Case No. 2013-6 (currently 
being edited) [U.S. Steel].
51  European Commission, amicus curiae brief, U.S. Steel Global Holding I B.V. (The 
Netherlands) v. The Slovak Republic, 15 May 2014, unpublished (with the author), [EU 
Commission’s amicus curiae brief, US Steel].
52  Although the EU Commission’s brief is not available online, the Commission was willing 
to share this brief with the author. Unfortunately, requests for any other briefs submitted 
by the Commission were denied. 
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The focus of this case was the removal of exemptions previously enjoyed 
by certain energy producers, with respect to certain fees. This measure, it was 
claimed, resulted in the breach of several provisions of the Netherlands-Slovakia 
BIT. The Commission intervened, this time on its own initiative, and claimed that 
according to EU Law, Slovakia was under an obligation to accept the contested 
measures and annul the exemptions. As in the above described EURAM case, 
a genuine normative conflict arises here; while an investment treaty (allegedly) 
instructs Slovakia to maintain its rules, the EU regime instructs it to annul 
them. 
As in the EURAM case, the Commission demanded that the investment 
tribunal decline jurisdiction. Also as in the EURAM case, the Commission based 
its contentions mainly on EU Law, despite the fact that it could have relied on 
arguments from the world of Public International Law. Even in the rare occasions 
in which the VCLT was consulted by the Commission (only two references in a 
25 page-long document that is dedicated to the relationship between treaties), the 
Commission chose to focus on the VCLT ’s most confrontational and excluding 
aspects. E.g., the Commission mentions Slovakia’s Treaty on Accession (2004), 
according to which Slovakia accepted the authority of existing EU Law. The EU 
Commission used this accession treaty in order to demonstrate the termination 
(and thus the exclusion) of the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT, based on Article 30 
VCLT. 
An alternative, more accommodating and less fragmented possibility, would 
have been the use of Articles 31 (3) (a), (b) and (c) of the VCLT, that require 
the Tribunal to interpret the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT in its context; to also 
take into account subsequent agreements between the parties regarding the 
application of the BIT; the parties’ subsequent practices, and “[a]ny relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”53 
Any of these provisions might have served the Commission’s purpose, which 
was guarding the integrity of its own Competition Law regime. Using these 
provisions, however, also meant an acknowledgment of the validity of the 
competing regime in this case, and recognizing it as a competing equivalent 
source of authority. Such an acknowledgement, as discussed below, was made 
only in later cases (see discussion below about the Czech cases). 
The clearest expression of the Commission’s rejection of any external 
legal authority can be found in paragraph 40 of the Commission’s brief. The 
53  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, Article 31 (3) (a), (b), (c), 1155 
UNTS 331 [VCLT ]; EU Commission’s amicus curiae brief, US Steel, supra note 50, 16, 
para. 49.
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Commission admits in this paragraph that its position has been rejected several 
times before by investment tribunals. Very undiplomatically, however, the 
Commission suggests that such previous decisions, in fact, do not mater, as 
long as the ECJ (“which has ultimate jurisdiction on matters of interpretation of 
Union law”) has not given its own ruling on this issue.54 
Lastly, the Commission adds a threat, one that in the below described 
Micula case has proved to be genuine. The Commission informs the Tribunal 
that if it decides against the Commission’s position and awards compensation 
to the investor – based on Investment Law – the Commission will regard such 
an award as the granting of new State Aid to the investor, and thus a possible 
violation of EU Law. The meaning of this announcement is that the execution 
of the award and the payment of compensation will be allowed “only if the 
Commission was to approve it”.55 
The Commission’s position in this respect is not based on any clear 
instruction provided by the EU Treaties concerning the relationship between EU 
Law and other international tribunals, but rather on the ruling of the ECJ in the 
Lucchini case, as well as on Articles 101, 107 and 108 TFEU.56 This comparison 
is interesting as the Lucchini case, as well as the mentioned TFEU provisions, 
state that due to the primacy of EU Law, national European courts should avoid 
issuing any decisions that might conflict with the EU’s laws on State Aid.57 The 
application of these rules on the decisions of international tribunals, including 
the stretching of the supremacy principle in this context, are the Commission’s 
own legal interpretation. 
The Commission’s legal interpretation is interesting for two reasons. First, 
it implies that the Commission considers competing international tribunals as 
equivalent to the EU member States’ national courts, a view that demonstrates the 
Commission’s notion of EU-supremacy also with respect to other international 
legal regimes. Secondly, based on these very legal provisions, here the Commission 
could also have chosen a different path: one that is based on Article 31 VCLT, by 
asking the Tribunal to view the mentioned EU legal provisions as a part of the 
investment treaty’s context, as a subsequent agreement/s, and as relevant rules of 
International Law applicable between the parties. The Commission’s choice to 
54  EU Commission’s amicus curiae brief, US Steel, ibid., para. 40.
55  Ibid., para. 20. 
56  Ministero dell’Industria, del Commercio e dell’Artigianato v. Lucchini SpA, Case No. 
119/05, Judgment of 18 July 2007 [2007], ECR I-6199.
57  EU Commission’s amicus curiae brief, US Steel, supra note 50, 21, para. 69.
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avoid basing its arguments on the VCLT is telling, in the author’s view, and will 
be discussed below in part III of this paper.
While the Tribunal’s reply to the Commission’s brief would have been, 
undoubtedly, informative and interesting, this case was eventually discontinued. 
The view of investment tribunals, however, can be learned from other cases 
discussed in this paper. 
3. The Commission’s Position in Micula v. Romania 
The proceedings in Micula v. Romania commenced in 2005, based on the 
Romania-Sweden BIT.58 In its final award (issued in 2013) the Micula Tribunal 
devoted only one paragraph to the purpose of summarizing the Commission’s 
amicus submission.59 On the face of it, this brief summary suggests a somewhat 
different narrative – one that is based on International Law. It mentions that 
the Commission requested that the interpretation given to the Romania-Sweden 
BIT will “take into account” the treaty’s “context and origin”.60 This argument 
implies the possibility that, unlike the above reviewed briefs, the Commission 
may have relied this time on Article 31 VCLT. The Tribunal further points out 
that the Commission relied on Article 30 (3) VCLT (the lex posterior rule), and 
asked the Tribunal to prioritize the EU’s State Aid rules, where these conflicted 
with the Sweden-Romania BIT. 
It should be noted however, that the issues reviewed by the Tribunal in 
this case are those that the Tribunal chose to address, and not necessarily those 
that were emphasized by the Commission in its confidential submission. Indeed 
in other cases where the Commission’s submissions were available to the author 
(e.g. in the EURAM case) the Tribunal chose to discuss International Law-
based claims, while the Commission’s own claims were in fact focussed on EU 
Law. Furthermore, as reviewed below, in other parts of the Micula award the 
Tribunal also refers to other arguments made by the Commission, which reflect 
the previously described Euro-supremacist approach.
The Micula Tribunal evaluated the role of EU Law in the interpretation 
of the BIT, according to the traditional rules of International Law. It stated 
58  Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
Romania on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 1 April 2003, available 
at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/laws/italaw6225.pdf (last visited 10 August 
2016).
59  Ioan Micula et al. v. Romania, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, 11 December 2013, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/20, para. 93 [Micula, Award].  
60  Ibid.
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that as Romania’s accession treaty61 (signed in 2005) did not address the BIT 
(entered into force in 2003), the Tribunal cannot assume that by acceding to 
the EU, any of the State parties wished to modify the BIT.62 The Tribunal then 
examined, based on Article 31 (2) VCLT, the BIT’s preamble and the original 
association agreement between the EU and Romania, in order to understand the 
treaty’s context, and found that the State parties did not intend to defeat their 
obligations under the BIT.63
Despite the Commission’s (apparent) reliance on International Law, the 
Commission’s supremacist approach, so it seems, was not abandoned. Similarly 
to the above described cases, the Commission in Micula stated that any award 
against Romania will not be enforceable within the EU, “by virtue of the 
supremacy of EC law”.64 Moreover, whilst acknowledging that Article 54 ICSID 
Convention65 requires the automatic enforcement of ICSID-based investment 
awards by national courts, the Commission claimed that in such a case EU Law 
requires that the enforcement proceedings be stayed, so as to allow the ECJ 
to decide on the status of Article 54 ICSID Convention under the EU regime. 
The Commission adds in this respect that as the EU itself is not a party to the 
ICSID Convention (although except Poland all of its Member States are), it is not 
therefore bound by Article 54 of this Convention.66 
The Commission’s argument concerning Article 54 ICSID Convention 
demonstrates the Commission’s view that EU Law should prevail not only in 
the case of a conflict with intra-EU investment treaties, but also in the case of 
a conflict with the ICSID Convention.67 This point is interesting, as unlike the 
61  Treaty Between Member States of the European Union and the Republic of Bulgaria and 
Romania, Concerning the Accession of the Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to the European 
Union, 21 June 2005, 48 Official Journal of the European Union L 157, 11.  
62  Micula, Award, supra note 59, paras 318-321. 
63  Ibid., paras 322-326. 
64  Ibid., paras 330, 334. 
65  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 14 October 1966, 575 UNTS 159.  
66  Ibid., para. 336. 
67  This argument is problematic for several reasons, notably because of the fact that, with 
the exception of Poland, all EU member States are members of the ICSID Convention. 
Furthermore, the Commission expressed its interest to “explore the possibility” of 
acceding to the ICSID Convention, but acknowledges that technical obstacles (only States 
can accede to this Convention) currently stop it from joining, see European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a Comprehensive 
European International Investment Policy, 7 July 2010, COM (2010) 343 final, 5, 10. 
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BITs discussed in the cases reviewed in this article, the Commission does not 
dispute the validity of the ICSID Convention; rather, it assumes that a perfectly 
valid Convention should not be observed by its Member States, due to potential 
clashes with EU Law.
After clarifying its position concerning the (lack of) enforceability of 
a future award against Romania, so as to sweeten the pill, the Commission 
added that it believed that a direct conflict between EU Law and the BIT and 
the ICSID Convention would be avoided, if the Commission’s above described 
VCLT-based arguments were to be accepted.68 In other words, the Commission 
provided the Tribunal with an opportunity to solve this matter in accordance 
with the traditional rules of International Law, followed by a warning that, if 
it adopts the wrong solution, the EU institutions would have to re-address the 
matter, this time under EU Law alone.
The Micula Tribunal chose to ignore the Commission’s threats, stating that 
“it is not desirable to embark on predictions as to the possible conduct of various 
persons and authorities after the Award has been rendered.”69 It did, however, 
feel the need to simply quote Articles 53 and 54 of the ICSID Convention in full, 
with no further explanations, as if to gently remind the parties (and especially 
the Commission) of their international obligations.70
4. The Post-Micula Events  
The Micula case is of interest regarding the debate on the fragmentation 
of International Law, not only because of the above discussion, but also (and 
perhaps mostly) because of the events that took place after the final award was 
issued. 
Despite the Commission’s threats, the Micula Tribunal decided on 11 
December 2013 to award compensation to the claimants. Immediately after 
issuing the award, the Commission started to act in order to frustrate its 
execution of this award. On 30 January 2014, the Commission announced to 
Romania that the implementation of the award would be considered as State Aid 
under EU Law.71 As Romania replied that it had already started to implement 
the award, the Commission issued a suspension injunction, ordering Romania 
to stop any further implementation of the award until a final decision was made 
68  Micula, Award, supra note 59, para. 336. 
69  Ibid., para. 340. 
70  Ibid.
71  Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015, 58 Official Journal of the 
European Union L 232, 43, para. 2 [Letter from the Commission].  
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concerning the compatibility of the State Aid with EU Law.72 In a letter issued 
in October 2014, the Commission announced to Romania that it indeed seemed 
that the State Aid was incompatible with EU Law, and accordingly an official 
investigation was to be launched.73
This letter presents some of the above described Euro-centric legal 
arguments, notably that any conflict between EU Law and other international 
regimes (the BIT and the ICSID Convention) is to be decided in accordance with 
EU Law alone,74 entirely avoiding any mentioning of the rules of International 
Law, or even the term International Law.
These events demonstrate that the Commission’s threats are not empty: 
The Commission intends to actively enforce the supremacy of EU Law by 
sanctioning any State that chooses to follow the rules of Public International 
Law, as understood by investment tribunals. As mentioned, such enforcement 
proceedings are being done in full isolation from, and with no regard to, 
International Law.   
5. The Commission’s Position in Eureko v. Slovakia
In Eureko v. Slovakia,75 the Commission presented similar claims to those 
described above. It claimed inter alia that EU Law and the relevant investment 
treaty are incompatible, and that the only court in which this matter can be 
resolved is the ECJ.76 The Commission further dismissed the traditional rules 
of International Law; for example, it claimed that the customary rule of pacta 
sunt servanda does not apply to inter-EU BITs, due to the EU’s principle of 
supremacy.77 The Commission also implicitly rejected the general rules of treaty 
interpretation, as set in Article 31 VCLT, by claiming that:
“[C]onflicts between BIT provisions and EU law cannot be resolved 
by interpreting and applying the relevant EU law provisions in the 
light of the BIT. Only the inverse approach is possible, namely 
interpretation of the BIT norms in the light of EU law.” 78
72  Ibid., para. 6. 
73  Ibid., para. 71.
74  Ibid., paras 51-55.
75  Eureko E.V. v. The Slovak Republic, Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and 
Suspension, 26 October 2006, PCA Case No. 2008-13 [Eureko, Award on Jurisdiction].
76  Ibid., paras 177-178. 
77  Ibid., para. 180.
78  The Eureko Tribunal quotes from the Commission’s submission, in ibid. 
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After stating its departure point, which is that International Law does 
not matter in light of EU Law’s supremacy, the Commission turned to what 
seems to be a rather redundant discussion on International Law. Concerning the 
termination of the BIT, the Commission admitted that the parties did not take 
any “decisive steps” for doing so, and that in light of the VCLT this treaty has 
not, in fact, been terminated.79 The Commission added however, that despite 
this, due to the supremacy of EU Law, any BIT provision that is incompatible 
with EU Law should be regarded as void.80 The Commission refers to Article 
30 (3) VCLT in order to claim that the latter treaty (EU Law) should prevail in 
a case of incompatibility between the regimes.81
Unlike the Commission’s approach, the Eureko Tribunal decided to 
approach this issue from the perspective of International Law,82 and provided 
a lengthy analysis of the relationships between EU Law and the BIT based on 
the provisions of the VCLT.83 The Tribunal’s analysis is somewhat integrationist 
in nature, as both EU Law and the ECJ’s jurisprudence are considered. The 
Tribunal’s analysis opens with the question of whether the BIT had been 
terminated based on Articles 59 and 65 VCLT.84 Interestingly, in this review the 
Tribunal acknowledges and considers decisions made by the ECJ, but decides 
that as the facts in the current case are somewhat different, the ECJ’s ruling 
cannot be applied.85 The Tribunal continued to evaluate the role of Article 
30 (3) VCLT, where the legality of the arbitral process is evaluated in light of 
EU Law, and several decisions made by the ECJ.86 It can be seen therefore that 
the Tribunal, unlike the Commission, is not shy of engaging with other fields of 
International Law and considers these as relevant.     
79  Eureko, Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 75, para. 187. 
80  Ibid., paras 187-188.
81  Ibid., paras 188-193.
82  The Tribunal states: “Whatever legal consequences may result from the application of EU 
law, those consequences must be applied by this Tribunal within the framework of the 
rules of international law and not in disregard of those rules.” Ibid., para. 229.
83  Ibid., paras 231-277.
84  Ibid., para. 231.
85  Ibid., paras 248-249. 
86  Ibid., paras 273-277. 
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6. The Commission’s Position in Electrabel v. Hungary
As in the above discussed cases, in Electrabel v. Hungary87 (Electrabel 
case) the Commission also demanded that the Tribunal decline jurisdiction. 
However, unlike the above described cases which concerned intra-EU BITs, this 
case was based exclusively on the Energy Charter Treaty88 (ECT).89
The Commission’s submission in this case is somewhat older than in the 
other cases discussed in this paper (amicus submission was filed in 2008),90 and 
so its approach, at least as appears from the Tribunal’s discussion (the amicus 
brief itself was not released to the author), was somewhat different from the 
other discussed pre-2015 cases. The Commission founded its arguments on a 
far less confrontational tone: The Commission reviewed the institutional links 
between the EU and ECT regimes, and acknowledged the fact that the ECT is 
binding on the EU’s institutions and Member States (a position that was later 
reversed in the four Czech cases).91 Furthermore, the Commission seemed much 
more inclined to rely on the traditional rules of International Law, and even 
presented legal arguments based on the non-confrontational, harmonzing parts 
of the VCLT, namely Article 31 of this Convention. 
It is difficult to explain the Commission’s unique position in this case, 
especially when evaluated in light of other briefs that were submitted by 
the Commission before and after this case. As the submission itself was not 
disclosed to the author, one may only speculate regarding the reasons. It is 
possible for example that, as in other cases, the Tribunal chose to concentrate on 
International Law in its decision while the Commission’s EU Law-based claims 
were mostly ignored (see for example the EURAM case). In any event, this 
submission represented a very unique exception to the Commission’s pre-2015 
approach. This case however, is nevertheless important as it somewhat predicted 
what seem to be an ideological U-turn that was taken seven years later by the 
Commission in its most recent submissions in the Czech cases, described below.
87  A review of the Commission’s brief was presented by the Tribunal in this case, see 
Electrabel SA v. Republic of Hungary, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and 
Liability, 30 November 2012, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19 [Electrabel], paras 27-34.
88  The Energy Charter Treaty, 17 December 1994, 2080 UNTS 95.  
89  Ibid., paras 4.11-4.12. 
90  Ibid., para. 1.18.
91  Ibid., paras 4.98-4.100. 
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7. The Commission Position in the Czech Cases
In April 2015 the Commission submitted four amicus briefs in four 
different investment arbitrations held between German investors and the Czech 
Republic (the Czech cases).92 These cases were all based on the same treaties, 
namely the ECT and the BIT between Germany and the Czech Republic, and 
concerned the same disputed State measure, namely changes made by the Czech 
Republic to its support scheme for the production of renewable energy. As all 
four submissions are in essence similar (mostly copy-pasted), the author will 
address them as one.93
On the face of it, these submissions represented a striking change in 
approach; there is hardly any trace left from the EU constitutional/supremacist 
approach displayed in previous submissions. Instead, the Commission’s 
arguments are almost exclusively based on International Law. Its legal point 
of departure is that EU Law should be evaluated against other international 
regimes, just as any one treaty is to be evaluated against others when conflicts 
arise. 
The Commission’s briefs open with an extensive analysis of the relationship 
between the different treaties, based on the lex posterior rule, as reflected in both 
Articles 59 and 30 of the VCLT.94 The Commission claims in this respect, that 
EU Law should trump not due to its inherent superiority, but rather to the 
fulfilment of the VCLT ’s rules concerning the termination of treaties and with 
respect to the relations between successive treaties. 
The Commission further argues that the ECT does not apply to the legal 
relations between the different EU Member States. Here as well the Commission’s 
arguments are not based on EU Law, but rather on the States’ intentions, or 
alternatively, on Article 30 VCLT.95 The Commission continued to demonstrate 
this claim by providing a lengthy review of the “Context, preparatory work 
92  Listed Czech Cases in supra note 31.
93  European Commission, written amicus curiae submission, Voltaic Network GmBH v. 
Czech Republic, 14 April 2015, unpublished (with the author) [Voltaic amicus submission]; 
European Commission, written amicus curiae submission, I.C.W. Europe Investments 
Limited v. Czech Republic, 8 April 2015, unpublished (with the author) [I.C.W. amicus 
submission]; European Commission,  Photovoltaic Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. Czech 
Republic, unpublished (with the author) [Photovoltaic amicus submission];  European 
Commission, written amicus curiae submission, WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited 
v. Czech Republic, 8 April 2015, unpublished (with the author) [WA Investment amicus 
submission].
94  Ibid., paras 28, 32, 33. 
95  Ibid., para. 50.
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and circumstances of the conclusion of the ECT”.96 This review, it is stated, 
is relevant for the application of Articles 31 and 32 VCLT,97 which requires a 
harmonious approach to be taken to treaty interpretation.
Lastly, unlike its stance in previous cases, the Commission avoided 
issuing statements that implied an EU-supremacist approach. For example, 
unlike in previous cases, there are no explicit demands “to respect the primacy 
of European Union law”,98 and no arguments are based on the “virtue of the 
supremacy of EC law”.99
At first glance, EU Law is no longer regarded as a supreme source of 
authority. Rather, it is seen by the Commission as one among many, whereby 
questions of hierarchy are resolved by a source that is external to the EU legal 
order (i.e. the VCLT ). This implies two ideological changes to the Commission’s 
previous approach. The first concerns the authoritative equality of EU Law vis-
à-vis other international sources of authority. The EU legal order is no longer 
addressed as a supreme legal order, which automatically trumps any competing 
source of authority. Rather, it is regarded as equal among many; one that will 
prevail over other sources only where recognized rules of International Law will 
allow. Secondly and somewhat related to the first point, the Commission’s new 
approach also represents an acknowledgement of the supremacy of the traditional 
rules of Public International Law. The Commission no longer tries to subject the 
relations between the EU and the BITs to EU rules, but rather agrees that such 
matters are subjected to a higher source of authority, that of the traditional rules 
of Public International Law, as reflected by the VCLT. 
In short, at least on the face of it, it seems that the Commission has finally 
decided to play the game of International Law. The author however, believes that 
this approach is still far from reflecting a genuine shift in approach. In part 5, at 
the very end of the International Law-oriented briefs, the Commission repeats 
is usual threat – that any award that will rule compensation against the State 
could be frustrated by the Commission.100 The Tribunals’ view on these claims 
96  Voltaic amicus submission, supra note 93, para. 54; I.C.W. amicus submission, supra note 
93, para. 54; Photovoltaic amicus submission, supra note 93, para. 54; WA Investment 
amicus submission, supra note 93, para. 54.
97  Ibid., Fn. 34, para. 77.
98  ‘EU Commission’s observations’, supra note 36.
99  Micula, Award, supra note 59, paras 330 and 334. 
100  Voltaic amicus submission, supra note 93, paras 118-128; I.C.W. amicus submission, 
supra note 93, paras 118-128; Photovoltaic amicus submission, supra note 93, paras 118- 
128; WA Investment amicus submission, supra note 93, paras 118-128.
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would have been interesting to assess. The Tribunals however, refused to accept 
these amicus submissions.101
C. Discussion  
The cases described above demonstrate that while the debate on 
the fragmentation of International Law has more or less disappeared, the 
fragmentation itself, including its most severe adverse effects, still takes place. 
These cases also underline the fact that international courts are not the only 
meaningful actors in this debate, and that other institutional actors are very 
relevant as well. Notably, the Commission reveals itself in these cases as an 
important agent of fragmentation, increasing the gaps between the different 
branches of International Law, as well as actively detaching EU Law, and EU 
Member States, from the general rules of International Law. The following 
section discusses some of the issues that emerge from the material reviewed 
above.   
I. The Commission’s Pre-2015 Approach: A Radicalization of the 
 ECJ’s Approach?
As discussed above, the isolationist approach of the ECJ with respect 
to International Law is not new. The author, however, believes that the ECJ’s 
constitutional approach, as presented in Kadi, has been radicalized by the 
Commission, and that this radicalization imposes a threat to the unity of 
International Law and to the delicate mechanisms that currently hold it together.
1. The Commission’s Decision to Speak European 
There is no doubt that the Commission continued the ECJ’s own Euro-
centric line with respect to the relationship between EU Law and International 
Law. But can the Commission’s line, as specifically reflected in its pre-2015 
submissions, be seen as a more extreme version of the ECJ’s? In the author’s 
view, it would appear that it can. While the ECJ certainly places International 
Law under EU Law, it did not always ignore its existence and validity. Indeed, 
in the past the ECJ has applied parts of Customary International Law in its 
101  The Tribunals’ decisions were not made public. All parties (including the Commission) 
refused to allow access to these decisions. 
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decisions,102 and has confirmed that the EU institutions are bound by it.103 Even 
in its notorious Kadi decision, the ECJ insisted that it was not the UN Security 
Council’s Resolution that it was challenging, but only its local implementation.104 
The ECJ further stated in this decision:
“In this respect it is first to be borne in mind that the European 
Community must respect international law in the exercise of its 
powers [FN omitted], the Court having in addition stated, in the 
same paragraph of the first of those judgments, that a measure 
adopted by virtue of those powers must be interpreted, and its scope 
limited, in the light of the relevant rules of international law.”105
The approach displayed by the Commission’s pre-2015 submissions seems 
not only to prioritize EU Law over other branches of International Law (as the 
ECJ did), but also to mostly ignore the existence of International Law. Notably, 
when addressing the relationship between the different regimes, the Commission 
repeatedly based its arguments on EU Law, by and large ignoring the VCLT. The 
Commission’s approach seems to reflect the view of Advocate General Maduro, 
as stated in his opinion in Kadi:
“The relationship between international law and the Community 
legal order is governed by the Community legal order itself, and 
international law can permeate that legal order only under the 
conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community.”106
The Commission’s insistence on applying the rule expressed in Maduro’s 
above quotation concerning the relationship between different regimes is in 
stark contradiction to the VCLT. While Madoro’s interpretation implies the 
102  See e.g., a review of the cases in which the ECJ applied customary international law in 
Ziegler, ‘Relationship’, supra note 15, 7.
103  Air Transport Association of America and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate 
Change, Case No. C366/10, Judgement of 21 December 2011, para. 101 [Air Transport 
Association]. 
104  Kadi, supra note 20, para. 298.
105  Ibid., para. 291.
106  Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Joined Cases Nos 
C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Judgment of 16 January 2008, para. 24 [Opinion of AG 
Maduro]. 
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assumption that Member States must all address their international obligations 
in light of EU Law, the VCLT requires an independent, de novo inquiry into the 
context, purpose, and notably also to the intentions of the concluding parties, in 
each and every case in which treaties interact. 
2. The Commission’s Exportation of the ECJ’s Approach
Secondly, the Commission’s above described steps seem to expand the 
application of the ECJ’s constitutional approach and apply it also to non-EU 
fora, in what seems to be an attempt to enforce its hegemony also outside of 
the EU legal sphere. In Kadi, as stated in opinion of some, the ECJ acted like 
a “domestic court”,107 considering the questions before it as mostly an internal 
issue,108 and therefore to be resolved in accordance with EU Law. The same 
legal logic however cannot be found in the Commission’s course of action; the 
Commission’s involvement in the investment cases took place outside of the 
EU’s home-court. The Commission operated in Investment Law proceedings, 
which were based on International Law and adjudicated by International Law 
experts. While it is expected that legal arguments presented in EU courts will be 
based on EU Law, the Commission seems to forget, or perhaps simply chooses to 
ignore the fact that it was operating in a foreign environment, where a different 
sets of norms, as well as a different legal logic, prevail. 
3. Expanding the Sense of Urgency Threshold  
Another indication of the Commission’s radicalization of the ECJ’s 
approach can be found in the threshold set by the Commission in its decision 
to contradict a competing source of authority. Simma submits that “as a rule, 
international judges or arbitrators have to experience an extreme sense of urgency 
before they would decide to straight-up contradict their colleagues in another 
international jurisdiction.”109 Applying the extreme sense of urgency threshold 
seems useful from the perspective of preventing fragmentation, as it guarantees 
high levels of respect for other branches of International Law and the prevention 
of conflicts in most cases. Furthermore, this test also allows some flexibility as it 
does not entirely stop courts from contradicting other authorities in International 
Law in order to safeguard those interests that are of fundamental importance. 
107  Ziegler, ‘Relationship’, supra note 15, 10. 
108  Kadi, supra note 20, para. 317.
109  Simma, ‘Fragmentation in a Positive Light’, supra note 5, 846.
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In Kadi, the ECJ dealt with the protection of fundamental human rights, 
which possess a somewhat constitutional status within the EU legal order.110 It 
can certainly be said that the necessity to protect human rights gives rise to an 
extreme sense of urgency and therefore may justify the contradiction of a competing 
source of authority, even one as important as the UN Security Council. On the 
other hand, it is difficult to argue that a similar extreme sense of urgency is what 
motivated the Commission in its own course of action. In the above described 
investment cases, the competing authority (the BITs) threatened to contradict 
mere competition laws. Important as these laws undoubtedly are, the existence 
of such an extreme sense of urgency in this context is doubtful at best. 
Moreover, even if one is to attach an extreme sense of urgency to the 
protection of the EU competition regime, one must remember that these 
investment arbitration awards did not challenge the validity of this regime as 
a whole, but at most required only a one-off exception with respect to specific 
economic actors. The fact that only a one-off exception is needed in this respect 
certainly reduces the sense of urgency to contradict other sources of authority.
4. Respect, Deference and the Unity of International Law 
One more indication of the radicalization of the ECJ’s approach by the 
Commission in the above discussed cases relates to non-legal elements such 
as respect and deference, which, as explained below, play an important role 
in upholding the unity of International Law. As stated by Wessel, the ECJ 
displayed in Kadi a certain respect to the competing international authority (the 
UN Charter in this case) by avoiding a direct challenge to its validity111 through 
creating a clear partition between the source of the competing norm (i.e. the 
UN Security Council Resolution, which the ECJ had no power to review)112 and 
its implementation (which is the EU’s measure that was the reviewed act in this 
case). The Commission on the other hand, challenged head-on the validity of 
the source’s competing norms, as well as the competing tribunals’ jurisdictions. 
Admittedly, the partition created by the ECJ in Kadi was without any 
practical consequences, as it is likely that any implementation of the UN 
Security Council Resolution would have been ruled as incompatible with EU 
Law. The ECJ’s approach, however, presented a certain respect and recognition 
110  Kadi, supra note 20, para. 283. 
111  R. Wessel, ‘Reconsidering the Relationship Between International and EU Law: Towards a 
Content-based Approach?’, in E. Cannizzaro, P. Palchetti & R. Wessel (eds), International 
Law as Law of the European Union (2011), 6, referring to Kadi, supra note 20, para. 298.
112  Kadi, supra note 20, para. 287.
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of International Law, as well as of the legal regimes that are external to the 
EU. This sense of respect corresponds with the unofficial, delicate and almost 
diplomatic mechanism that was described by Judges Simma and Guillaume, 
which attributes the coherence and the unity of International Law to 
international judges’ informal decision to display “utmost caution in avoiding 
to contradict each other.”113 This mechanism, as mentioned above, is dependent 
not on any official rule, but rather on judges’ willingness to support the unity of 
International Law, even, as stated by Simma, “at the price of dodging issues that 
would very much have deserved to be tackled.”114
One, therefore, may wonder what the implications of the Commission’s 
approach are, and how it could impact this delicate mechanism. Former Judge 
Guillaume stated in this respect that “[t]his work of co-ordination is very much 
dependent on the attitude of the judges, and on their ability to determine their 
own competence while keeping in mind their position within the international 
framework.”115 Will such an explicit lack of respect change judges’ attitude and 
reduce their willingness in the future to cooperate? Will judges resume applying 
a holistic and systemic legal approach while operating under one regime, where 
it is clear to them that their competition has no intention of doing the same? 
The answers to these questions are not yet clear at the time of writing. It 
is possible however that some implications are already noticeable. For example, 
in the more recent Czech cases the tribunals refused to accept the Commission’s 
request to submit an amicus brief.116 As the Commission refused to disclose these 
decisions, the author has no knowledge of their content. One however, may 
speculate that the Commission’s own isolationist pre-2015 approach had some 
(possibly informal) influence on the Tribunals’ lack of willingness to engage 
with it. If this speculation is correct,117 this could mean that it is likely that 
fragmentation will increase in the future. 
113  Simma, ‘Fragmentation in a Positive Light’, supra note 5, 846. 
114  Ibid. 
115  Guillaume, supra note 7.
116  See listed Czech Cases in supra note 31.
117  It should be mentioned, however, that even if the above described decisions will be 
published in the future, the correctness of this speculation will be difficult to assess. This 
is due to the fact that it is very unlikely that adjudicators will openly discuss such a non-
legal element as the displayed lack of respect as a reason for their refusal to allow these 
interventions. 
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II. The Czech Cases: A Damascene Conversion?
As discussed above, in April 2015 the Commission submitted four amicus 
briefs, which were based on a completely different approach. Notably, although 
the Commission kept arguing that EU Law should prevail, and generally 
attempted to promote the same outcome it had tried in previous cases, this 
time it chose to advocate its cause based on the traditional rules of Public 
International Law. For the first time,118 it seems that the Commission is whole-
heartedly accepting the role of Public International Law with respect to the 
relations between different treaties, as well as the place of the EU regime as one 
among many, and as operating under, or within Public International Law.
For all the reasons described above, the author believes the Commission’s 
apparent sudden change of heart could be seen as a positive development. 
Notably, it is far more respectful towards other international sources of 
authority. Moreover, it brings back at least some sense of order and security into 
the informal, delicate mechanism described above, based on which the unity 
of the international legal system is maintained, and on which states rely while 
acting in the world of international relations. 
At least on the face of it, it could also be argued that the Commission’s new 
position departs from that of the ECJ. The ECJ, as reviewed above, views the 
EU Treaties as constitutional documents rather than international treaties, and 
have treated these on several occasions as superior to other international sources 
of authority. By treating the EU legal regime as equal to other international 
regimes, and by subjected it to Public International Law, the Commission’s 
approach seems to depart from the ECJ’s somewhat isolationist approach, and, 
to a certain extent, pulls the EU legal order back into the world of International 
Law.
On the other hand, despite the change in rhetoric, the Commission did 
not back away from its refusal to allow the enforcement of the awards, should 
these be considered as State Aid.119 In other words, regardless to the VCLT rules 
on conflicts between treaties, at the end of the day the Commission will choose 
to unilaterally frustrate the objectives of any competing treaty in order to ensure 
the superiority of EU Law. In making its decision on State Aid, the Commission 
will not consider the VCLT rules, nor the fact that such State Aid was in fact 
justified under International Law. In the author’s view, this issue significantly 
118  With the exception of the above discussed Electrable, supra note 87. 
119  Voltaic amicus submission, supra note 93, paras 118-128; I.C.W. amicus submission, 
supra note 93, paras 118-128; Photovoltaic amicus submission, supra note 93, paras 118-
128; WA Investment amicus submission, supra note 93, paras 118-128.
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waters down the importance of the Czech cases and the Commission’s apparent 
change of heart.
The Commission, so it appears, had no intentions of backing away from 
its original goal. Why then did the Commission change its rhetoric so suddenly? 
One may only speculate. A reasonable explanation, however, would be that the 
Commission’s legal agents simply attempted to win. After failing to convince 
investment tribunals on so many occasions, every sensible lawyer would start 
questioning their strategic choices. As all pre-2015 decisions clearly demonstrate 
that investment arbitrators will address, and consider, mostly VCLT-based claims, 
it is likely that the message finally went through, and that the Commission’s 
legal agents decided to play the cards which were most likely to succeed. But as 
already stated, the change in rhetoric in this case does not necessarily mean a 
change of approach. 
III. The Role of Non-Court Actors in the Debate  
The implications of the Commission’s pre-2015 approach and its explicit 
lack of respect may go even further than judges’ mere unwillingness to apply a 
harmonized approach to International Law. Former Judge Guillaume mentions 
a certain negative competition between the different tribunals:
“Every judicial body tends – whether or not consciously – to assess 
its value by reference to the frequency with which it is seised. 
Certain courts could, as a result, be led to tailor their decisions so 
as to encourage a growth in their caseload, to the detriment of a 
more objective approach to justice. Such a development would be 
profoundly damaging to international justice.”120
Some questions arise following Guillaume’s warning, and in light of the 
Commission’s activity in this field. Will other international tribunals begin to 
send their proxies, for example their secretariats, to intervene in other tribunals’ 
proceedings in order to demand their jurisdiction? The ECJ is not the only 
Tribunal to claim exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of disputes. For 
example, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute settlement mechanism 
claims exclusive jurisdiction over disputes that concern WTO Law violations.121 
120  Guillaume, supra note 7. 
121  See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 15 April 
1994, Article 23, 1869 UNTS 401.
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The possibility of overlapping jurisdictions has been discussed in the context of 
WTO Law, especially with respect to regional and bilateral trade agreements,122 
but also in relation to other international regimes such as multilateral 
environmental agreements.123 Should we expect the rather influential secretariat 
of the WTO124 to intervene in the future where such overlapping cases arise, in 
order to demand that cases be re-directed towards the WTO? 
Whether this concern seems somewhat exaggerated or not, there is 
no escaping the fact that the role of the Commission, in the context of the 
debate on the fragmentation, is meaningful. Notably, it demonstrates that 
the fragmentation can be enhanced not only by courts, but also by other 
institutional actors who are keen enough to protect their own territory without 
paying heed to larger systemic implications. Other institutional actors, even if 
not as powerful as the Commission, can also intervene in the proceedings of 
international courts as the Commission has done. For example, Article 34 (2) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice125 specifically grants a special legal 
status to international organizations, making these bodies the sole entity that is 
currently authorized to submit amicus curiae briefs to the International Court 
of Justice. Other Tribunals are also receiving amicus briefs from international 
organizations. For example, the World Health Organization has recently 
requested to submit an amicus brief in a certain investment dispute.126
The role of non-judicial institutional actors in the context of fragmentation 
has been discussed in the past by the author.127 Notably, the author has 
122  See e.g., K. Kwak & G. Marceau, ‘Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between 
WTO and RTAs’, Conference on Regional Trade Agreements World Trade Organization - 
Executive Summary (2002), available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/
sem_april02_e/marceau.pdf (last visited 14 July 2016); C. Henckels, ‘Overcoming 
Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO-FTA Nexus: A Potential Approach for the 
WTO’, 19 European Journal of International Law (2008) 3, 571.
123  G. Marceau, ‘Conflicts of norms and conflicts of jurisdiction: The relationship between 
the WTO agreement and MEAs and other treaties’ 35 Journal of World Trade (2001) 6, 
1081, 1122-1124. 
124  See e.g., S. Jinnah, ‘Overlap management in the World Trade Organization: Secretariat 
influence on trade-environment politics’ 10 Global Environmental Politics (2010) 2, 54.
125  Statute of the International Court of Justice, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.  
126  C. Trevino & L. E. Peterson, ‘World Health Organization is given green-light by 
arbitrators to intervene in Philip Morris v. Uruguay arbitration’ (2015), available at 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/world-health-organization-is-given-green-light-by-
arbitrators-to-intervene-in-philip-morris-v-uruguay-arbitration/ (last visited 1 August 
2016).
127  A. Kent, ‘Implementing the principle of policy integration: Institutional interplay and the 
role of international organizations’ 14 International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
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examined the potential positive role that institutional actors can play in 
overcoming fragmentation, including by the exchange of expert knowledge 
and the informing of decision-making processes. The above discussed cases, 
however, and particularly the post-Micula events, demonstrate well that the role 
of institutional actors may also be negative, one of enforced fragmentation and 
the silencing of a judicial dialog. 
The role of non-judicial institutional actors in this respect raises another 
important question; one that relates to the delicate mechanism described by 
Simma and Guillaume and discussed above, and its applicability to other 
actors besides judges. It could be argued that this mechanism is based on a 
certain collegial relationship between judges and their understanding of the 
International Law as a whole. Therefore, it is possible that actors who are not so 
clearly affiliated with this social and professional milieu may not be inclined to 
respect this mechanism. 
IV. The Way Forward 
1. A Grim Point of Departure
The final part of this article essentially asks: What now can be done? The 
grim starting point (at least from the perspective of those who are concerned 
by the unity of the international legal order), is that any substantive shift in 
approach is somewhat unlikely. When evaluating the above described situation, 
it seems probable that some elements that are related more to sociology than to 
law are in play. The tendency to see one’s own group as somewhat more central 
than others’ was mentioned in the context of the fragmentation by authors such 
as David Kennedy, who commented on this issue:
“When we public international lawyers look out the window, we 
see a world of nation states and worry about war. We remember 
the great wars of the twentieth century. We were traumatized by 
the holocaust, fear totalitarianism and are averse to ideology. […] 
Trade lawyers, by contrast, look out the window and see a world 
of buyers and sellers struggling to deal. Their trauma was the great 
depression.”128
Law and Economics (2014) 3, 203.
128  D. Kennedy, ‘One, Two, Three Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the Cosmopolitan 
Dream’ 31 New York University Review of Law and Social Change (2007) 3, 641, 650.  
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Koskenniemi adds in this regard:
“To be doing ‘trade law’ or ‘human rights law’ or ‘environmental 
law’ or ‘European law’ – as the representatives of those projects 
repeatedly tell us – is not just to operate some technical rules but to 
participate in a culture, to share preferences and inclinations shared 
with colleagues and institutions who identify themselves with that 
‘box’”.129
These descriptions seem to correspond well with the EU’s own professional 
legal community. A review of the current ECJ judges’ profiles130 reveals that, with 
very few exceptions, these judges’ professional environment and background can 
be defined as highly EU-oriented. The same could probably be said about the 
Commission’s Eurocrats, most of whom have developed professionally within 
the EU system. This social fragmentation may explain the EU legal community’s 
entrenchment within its own constitutional approach. In light of this background 
it would seem that the expectation of a complete change of approach from the 
EU institutions may be somewhat exaggerated. 
Furthermore, due to its own job description, the Commission may not be 
willing to change its ways. The Commission is often defined as the “guardian 
of the treaties”, whose role is to “promote the general interest of the Union” 
and “oversee the application of Union law”.131 It is not surprising therefore that 
the Commission chose to address EU Law in isolation from elements such as 
Public International Law, and shows very little interest in considering the unity 
of International Law.
Despite this difficult point of departure, the EU Commission seems to 
have modified its approach and, at least to a certain extent, to break away from 
the EU-isolationist approach demonstrated both by the Commission and the 
ECJ. On the face of it, this move is encouraging from the perspective of those 
who are interested in keeping the unity of the international legal system. But 
as stated above, the Commission’s ideological U-turn was somewhat watered 
129  M. Koskenniemi, ‘International law: Between Fragmentation and Constitutionalism’, 
27 November 2006, available at http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/
MCanberra-06c.pdf (last visited 14 July 2016), 4. 
130  See http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/ (last visited 14 July 2016).
131  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 13 December 2007, Art 17 (1), 
2008/ C 115/01.
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down by its insistence with respect to the (lack of) enforcement of investment 
tribunals’ awards within the EU.
In short, when asking: What now can be done? the first part of the answer 
should be: ‘Let us not expect much’. But nevertheless, the author believes that 
one possible route seems feasible, notably because in part, it is already being 
applied. 
2. An Increasing Role for the ECJ and the Sense of Urgency 
 Threshold
The above discussion presents a certain challenge for those who are 
concerned with the unification of International Law. It describes the activity 
of non-judicial bodies, which may have no grasp of, or interest in, upholding the 
unity of International Law. This situation simply cannot sit comfortably with 
the informal mechanism described by Guillaume and Simma, which is based 
on judges, and their willingness to uphold the unity of International Law. What 
then, should, or could be done about it? 
As stated above, the informal mechanism described by Guillaume 
and Simma is based on judges, and their willingness to uphold the unity of 
international law. Maybe it is time to remind ECJ judges of their role in this 
respect. Despite the ECJ’s own constitutional approach, the author believes that 
this institution could take several steps, even if declaratory in nature, to mitigate 
some of the impression made by the Commission, as well as to provide some 
guidance. 
The author does not expect the ECJ to completely abandon its own 
constitutional approach. Rather, it is claimed that the ECJ should consider the 
explicit adoption of the sense of urgency threshold, sending the message that 
where the integrity of the EU regime is not being threatened, the ECJ, and 
the Commission, should attempt to accommodate the decisions of non-EU 
tribunals as much as possible. 
As stated above, the author believes that this is by no means a radical 
step, as the ECJ is, implicitly, already following the sense of urgency test. The 
use of this test seems useful as it allows the necessity to balance two elements 
that seem, at times, to be in competition; the need to respect the authority of 
competing international sources of authority on the one hand, and the need to 
protect those fundamental elements in one’s regime, on the other.
The need to balance these two elements seems to be currently missing 
from the Commission’s perception of its job description as the guardian of the 
treaties. The explicit adoption of the sense of urgency also by the Commission 
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will therefore enable it to guard the EU treaties, but to do so in context, and in 
understanding of the wider international environment. 
3. Hold Actions Until Political Negotiations Are Done 
Another, albeit less legal, solution for this situation is simply to 
hold any action until the EU Member States come out with a clear answer. 
The fragmentation of International Law is first and foremost the result of 
uncoordinated law-making. Turning the wheels back to the law-making point 
of negotiations therefore, may resolve these specific conflicts. 
The above discussion presents a picture of normative conflicts between 
different regimes. Although there is a certain legal uncertainty as to which 
regimes should prevail, the Commission seems very decisive in its views and 
actions, and as to the desired result. There is no doubt that the Commission 
represents the EU’s interests; but the EU, one must remember, is a collective of 
States, and is made of a collective of rules that were agreed upon by these States. 
It is not clear at all that the Commission’s position on this matter represents 
the will of its Member States, and the level of their consent to be bound by 
this legal regime. For example, the Eureko Tribunal invited the Netherlands’ 
government to express its opinion regarding the validity of the Netherlands-
Slovakia BIT in light of the Commission’s arguments. In a reply letter, the 
Netherlands’ Ministry of Economic Affairs stated that the relevant EU Law 
should not be seen as terminating the BIT, and that the EU must respect 
International Law, “in particular with respect to the termination and suspension 
of international treaties.”132 The Netherlands’ view was indeed enforced by an 
informal confirmation granted by Slovakia, the respondent in this case, that 
indeed the BIT between these States is still valid.133
Both States also agreed that this issue should be resolved by the States 
themselves, through a process of political negotiations.134 The Commission 
published on its website that “Regarding this issue, the Commission is in 
close contact with the Member States and has repeatedly reiterated that the 
incompatibility of intra-EU BITs with EU law means that they have to be 
brought to an end.”135
132  Eureko, Award on Jurisdiction, supra note 75, para. 157. 
133  Ibid., para. 159.
134  Ibid., paras 162, 163, 166, 167. 
135  European Commission, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties between EU Member States 
(intra-EU BITs)’, available at http://ec.europa.eu/finance/capital/analysis/monitoring_
activities_and_analysis/index_en.htm (last visited at 23 October 2016).
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In light of the above, the Commission’s decision to intervene in these 
disputes and to take legal action against certain Member States seems 
questionable. The Commission is aware of the fact that this issue is currently 
under discussion, and it is certainly unclear that the Commission’s view will 
prevail eventually. Why then, take such drastic action? Why not wait for the 
sovereign, the Member States in this case, to express their opinion? 
Holding back from any further action at this stage seems both politically 
and legally appropriate. One must remember that the use of complex treaty 
interpretation rules, or normative conflict resolution rules, is necessary only 
where the ordinary meaning of the treaty is not clear. The fact that negotiations 
are taking place, and a practical, politically accepted solution may be agreed 
upon by the Member States, seems not only politically preferable, but also legally 
correct as it will save treaty interpreters the need to read (unknown) meaning 
into current legal lacunas. At the same time, it is important to remember that 
such a concrete solution will apply only to the currently discussed legal conflicts, 
and will not be useful in order to resolve the wider problem discussed in this 
paper, which is the isolationist, supremacist legal approach presented by the 
Commission. 
